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I. INTRODUCTION

Forum shopping is generally deplored as a dubious tactical maneuver.
Courts routinely denounce parties who they find engaged in forum shopping and
try to ensure that those parties gain no procedural advantage.' Notwithstanding the
Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York; B.A., Yale University, 1992; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1995. The views expressed in this article are my own. I wish to thank Melissa Hart for her
comments on an earlier draft. I am particularly grateful to my wife, Robyn Tamofsky, without whose
suggestions and encouragement this article, which took longer to write than it should have, would not have
been completed.
See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987)
1
(adopting a uniform federal statute of limitations because "the use of a state statute would present the danger

of forum shopping"); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (stating that "discouragement of forumshopping" is a reason why federal courts apply state law in cases based upon diversity-of-citizenship

jurisdiction).
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judicial disapproval of forum shopping, litigants can regularly affect the outcome
of their dispute by where they file suit and how they cast their claims. The result is
a striking disparity between the common practice of forum shopping and the
widespread disapproval of the practice.
One reason for this disparity is that our legal system lacks a comprehensive
explanation of why there are opportunities for forum shopping. Forum shopping
can be seen as fortuitous - the byproduct of a judicial system with courts of
independent, but overlapping, jurisdiction.2 Under this view, courts should strive to
close the procedural loopholes that permit litigants to influence the choice of
forum. Yet some forum shopping is considered legitimate - instances where a
litigant is entitled to choose the place of suit.3 These cases raise the question of
what justifies a litigant's forum selection that otherwise would be condemned as
forum shopping. And the most common context in which that question arises is
how much to defer to the plaintiff s initial choice of forum.4
The forum in which a case is heard often has considerable influence on the
outcome. The judge and jury, the procedural rules, and in some cases the
substantive law as well, all depend on the place of suit. The procedural skirmishes
at the outset of many lawsuits - such as over whether the case can be removed to
federal court, or whether venue should be transferred - reflect the reality that the
forum can be decisive. Yet, despite the manifest importance of where the case is
heard, remarkably little attention has been paid to ascertaining the underlying
principles of forum selection. This deficiency is due in part to the fragmented
nature of forum-selection law, which is composed of several ostensibly unrelated
legal doctrines. Subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue and forwn
non conveniens all address, albeit from different vantage points, the single question
of forum selection.
The aim of this article is to explore the fundamental tensions within each
of the legal doctrines regarding forum selection, resulting from the presence of two
competing legal principles. The first principle, which I will call "plaintiff's choice,"
proceeds from the premise that the plaintiff has the privilege of selecting the place
of suit. We tend to take this privilege for granted because the plaintiff exercises it at
the outset of every civil lawsuit. In choosing where to bring suit, the plaintiff
shapes the course of the litigation before any judicial involvement. The plaintiff's
forum-selection privilege is axiomatic to the common-law tradition of party
autonomy. It is related to the idea that the plaintiff is the "master of his complaint"
and thereby frames the issues for judicial resolution. The roots of the plaintiffs

2

See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990) ("An opportunity for forum shopping

exists whenever a party has a choice of forums that will apply different laws.").
See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (holding that in forum
non
conveniens analysis, "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed").
3

The degree of deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum arises, for example, in motions to
transfer venue. See infra Part HI.C.
4
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privilege lie in the party-initiated pleading system at common law.5 The plaintiffs
privilege is so ingrained in our jurisprudence, and so rarely challenged on its own
terms, that it is seldom discussed. The practical effect of the forum-selection
privilege, however, is undeniable: the place of suit usually ends up being the forum
that the plaintiff chose.
The competing legal principle is what I will call "judicial management."
This principle postulates that an appropriate court - rather than the plaintiff should decide what is the proper place of suit. The primary consideration should be
the convenient and efficient resolution of disputes - such as avoiding duplicative
litigation and selecting the forum most convenient to all parties and witnesses. The
judicial-management principle thus calls for the kind of judicial balancing
characteristic of modem legal thought. Because courts rarely act sua sponte, the
judicial-management principle is usually invoked in response to a motion by the
defendant. Yet this principle aspires to be party-neutral; it balances the interests of
plaintiff and defendant to determine the most convenient forum. In contrast to
plaintiff's choice, the judicial-management principle is discussed explicitly in some
judicial opinions, has motivated the legislative enactment of certain procedural
reforms and has met with increasing approval in the legal literature in recent years.'
The plaintiffs-choice and judicial-management principles co-exist
uneasily. Both principles have the explanatory power to answer on their own all the
doctrinal questions regarding forum selection, yet in practice each is hemmed in by
the other. The plaintiff has the initial choice of forum, but the defendant then has
recourse to various legal doctrines - such as transfer of venue and dismissal for
forum non conveniens - that counteract the plaintiffs choice and seek judicial
management of the place of suit. Each of these doctrines has various rules, subrules and exceptions to rules that in turn reflect either the plaintiffs-choice or the
judicial-management principle. Tellingly, neither principle dominates the other.
Rather, both principles remain vital in developing the law of forum selection.
In this article, I seek to locate these two legal principles across a broad
range of doctrines regarding forum selection in civil lawsuits. By exploring
generally familiar legal doctrines through the lenses of the two competing juridical
models, I hope to shed light on the causes of the conflicted nature of the law of
forum selection.
In Part II, I examine the selection of venue, including forum non
conveniens and transfer of venue, as well as personal jurisdiction. I argue that the
legal rules regarding venue are perhaps the starkest example of the unresolved
tension between the plaintiffs-choice and judicial-management principles. In
Part III, I turn to the selection of court system, particularly the degree of control the
plaintiff can sometimes exercise over whether a suit can be removed from state to
federal court. In Part IV, I examine some aspects of duplicative litigation, including
anti-suit injunctions and federal-court abstention, that raise the issue of deference to
See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 4-5 (4th ed. 1992).
6

See, e.g., Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Robert F. Peckham,

The FederalJudge as Case Manager: The New Role in Cidinga Casefrom Filing to Disposition,69 CAL.

L. REV. 770 (1981).
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the plaintiffs choice of forum. In Part V, I turn to the important implications of
forum selection for choice of law, including institutional biases in favor of applying
forum law and the choice-of-law consequences of transfer of venue.
Finally, in Part VI, I conclude with some thoughts on forum shopping.
Despite the disapproving connotations of the term, forum shopping is the inevitable
corollary of the plaintiffs-choice principle. If the courts will defer to the plaintiffs
choice, then plaintiffs will naturally try to shop for the most favorable forum. I
conclude that "forum shopping" - as employed in current legal usage - is little
more than a verbal formulation for arguments rejecting, in certain doctrinal
contexts, the plaintiff's-choice principle.
II.
A.

VENUE

Venue Statutes

One reason the plaintiff has a choice of forum is that venue statutes afford
him that choice. Rather than define the proper venue with specificity, venue statutes
typically let the plaintiff choose among a number of courts - albeit a limited
number -- in which venue is proper.7 In federal court, the range of permissible
venues for suits against individual defendants currently includes the judicial district
where the defendant resides, any district where a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the plaintiffs claim occurred, and (if the action can be brought
nowhere else) any district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.8
Thus, the statute by its terms grants the plaintiff leeway to select a venue that he
considers convenient to him, or - and the two are often corollaries inconvenient to the defendant.
A venue statute need not be so generous. Indeed, under the Judiciary Act
of 1789, venue for suit "against an inhabitant of the United States" lay only in a
district "whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of
serving the writ." 9 As recently as 1966, venue for suits against individual
defendants in federal-question cases was limited, even more restrictively, to "the
judicial district where any defendant resides."10 Frequently, the stingy venue rules
in federal court at that time offered the plaintiff only one judicial district presumptively convenient to the defendant because it was pegged to his residence.
The current statute, reacting against the perceived arbitrariness of those venue
limitations, has liberalized venue choices. The statute incorporates judicialmanagement principles by including party-neutral venue choices focused on the
substance of the lawsuit, such as where the events giving rise to the plaintiffs

7
8
9

10

See JAMES ET AL., supra note 5, § 2.23, at 97.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b) (1994).
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1964), amended by Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111 (1966).
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claim occurred. 1 This type of venue choice is more likely to be an efficient and
convenient place to resolve the dispute.
The cases appear conflicted over whether the purpose of venue statutes is
to provide the plaintiff with a choice of venue or to further judicial management by
protecting against unreasonable venue choices. An excellent example of the
plaintiffs-choice view of venue is the 1941 Supreme Court case of Baltimore &
Ohio Railroadv. Kepner.12 In Kepner, the plaintiff chose a forum with no relation
to where the events giving rise to his claim occurred - probably because he
thought the jury there would likely award higher damages. The Court upheld the
plaintiff's choice of venue, because "venue is a privilege created by federal
statute," and that privilege "cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience or
expense."' 3 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter denied that the venue statute at issue
"was intended to give a plaintiff an absolute and unqualified right to compel trial of
his action in any of the specified places he chooses."' 4 Expressing the judicialmanagement principle, Justice Frankfurter urged that the place of suit be
determined by judicial balancing of the conveniences to the parties and the public.' s
In contrast, the judicial-management principle carried the day in Leroy v.
Great Western United Corp.1 6 The Court announced that, "[i]n most instances, the
purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk
that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial."'" In Leroy, the
Court decided that the venue statute then in place, which allowed venue in "the
judicial district.. in which the claim arose,"' 8 should be read narrowly so that
only in "unusual case[s]" could a claim arise in more than one judicial district. 9
The Leroy decision was based on the premise that "Congress did not intend ... to

11

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), (b)(2) (1994).

314 U.S. 44 (1941). In Kepner, a railroad employee who resided and was injured in Ohio brought
suit in the Eastern District of New York, under a special venue provision of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA) that lay venue in any district in which the employer was doing business. The railroad then
brought suit in Ohio state court to enjoin the employee from maintaining the FELA suit in New York.
12

13

Id at 52-53.

Id at 57 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter's dissent also raised the federalism
implications of the denial of the state-court anti-suit injunction. See id. at 54. It has since been established
that "state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions."
Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,413 (1964).
15
See Kepner, 314 U.S. at 57-58 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
14

16
443 U.S. 173 (1979). The issue in Leroy was whether venue lay in the Northern District of Texas
for a suit by a corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas, against Idaho state officials
who applied an Idaho anti-takeover statute to the plaintiff's proposed tender offer for the stock of a
corporation with its principal place of business in Idaho.
17
Id at 183-84 (emphasis in original).
18

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976) (emphasis added).

19

Leroy, 443 U.S. at 185.
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give [the plaintiff] an unfettered choice among a host of different districts.,,20 The
Leroy Court's narrow reading of the venue statute furthered the judicialmanagement principle because the courts would determine where the claim arose
-the only proper venue besides the defendant's residence.
The reason for the conflicting language in the cases is that modem venue
statutes are expressly designed to promote both the plaintiff's-choice and the
judicial-management principles. As the Leroy Court held, the statutory limitations
on venue are intended to prevent the plaintiff from selecting an unfair or
inconvenient place of suit.21 On the other hand, as Kepner makes plain, the statute's
affirmative grant of venue, by providing the plaintiff with a range of proper places
for suit, manifestly serves the plaintiff's interests. 2 And the more the venue statute
is liberalized, the more significant, too, becomes the plaintiffs venue privilege.
That is the irony of the modem movement toward greater emphasis on systemic
convenience in laying venue: by discarding the often arbitrary statutory limitations
on venue, and providing a wider range of venue choices, reformers have
paradoxically increased the effect of the plaintiff's forum-selection privilege.
Statutory reforms intended to lead to more efficient venue rules have instead
resulted in more choices for the plaintiff, and consequently greater arbitrariness in
venue.
B.

Forum Non Conveniens

The plaintiffs choice of forum can be overridden by forum non
conveniens, a prudential doctrine explicitly based on the interests of the judicial
system as a whole.23 Forum non conveniens allows the judge to dismiss a lawsuit in
favor of an alternative, more convenient forum even though venue is proper.24 A
thorough-going effectuation of the forum non conveniens doctrine promises to
instantiate the judicial-management model: a judge would determine what forum
would be most convenient for all parties and best serve the interests of the judicial
system. Most state courts recognize theforum non conveniens doctrine, particularly
as applied to out-of-state plaintiffs.25 With the introduction by statute of transfer of
venue in the federal courts,26 however, forum non conveniens retains vitality in
20

Id. In reaction to Leroy, Congress has amended the federal venue statute to permit venue in "a

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), (b)(2) (1994).
21
See Leroy, 443 U.S. at 184.
22

See Kepner, 314 U.S. at 57-58 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Norwood's argument, based on Leroy,

that, "[d]espite current views to the contrary, choice of venue is not a party's right," focuses only on the
limitations on venue and ignores the affirmative grant of venue choices. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping
fora Venue: The Needfor More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267,311-12 (1995).
23

See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).

24

See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,447-48 (1994).

25

See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 20 (Cal. 1991).

26

See infra Part I.C.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss2/5

6

Ryan: Principles of Forum Selection

PRINCIPLES OFFORUMSELECTION

2000]

federal court only when the alternative forum is a foreign court 2 Despite the
doctrine's limited scope of application, forum non conveniens serves as a primary
example of the ambivalent attitude of the law toward the plaintiff's forum-selection
privilege.
The classic formulation of the doctrine offorum non conveniens came in
Justice Jackson's opinions for the Supreme Court in the 1947 companion cases of
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert28 and Koster v. (American)Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co. 29 First, Justice Jackson established the general principle that a court has "the
power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances."30 He then observed that
venue statutes "are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a
choice of courts," which he attributed to a desire that the plaintiff "[might] be quite
sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy." 31 Unfortunately, some plaintiffs
resort to "misuse of venue" by bringing suit in an inconvenient court, which Justice
Jackson described as "justice blended with some harassment." 32 Justice Jackson set
forth several "private interest[s]" for the trial court to weigh in its discretion access to evidence, availability of witnesses, enforceability of the judgment, and
inconvenience to the defendant - as well as "[fiactors of public interest" - the
congestion of the courts, the imposition of jury duty, local decision of
controversies, and application of state law by federal judges more. familiar with it.'
All of the foregoing is a ringing exposition of the judicial-management
principle. Yet without explanation, Justice Jackson in Gilbert threw in a crucial
qualification: "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." 4 In Koster, Justice Jackson
added that, when a plaintiff brings suit at his residence:
[hie should not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his
home jurisdiction except upon a clear showing of facts which
either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation to a
defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiffs convenience,
which may be shown to be slight or nonexistent, or (2) make trial
in the chosen forum inappropriate because of considerations
affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems.5

27

See American Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 449 n.2.

28

330 U.S. 501 (1947).

29

330 U.S. 518 (1947).

30

Gilbert,330 U.S. at 504.

31

Id. at 507.

32

Id

3

See id. at 508-09.

34

Id at 508.

35

Koster,330 U.S. at 524.
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By these dicta, the Supreme Court reinstated the plaintiff's-choice
principle as the general rule in forum non conveniens doctrine and limited dismissal
to extraordinary cases. The Court offered no means of resolving the inherent
tensions between the principles underlyingforum non conveniens dismissal and the
competing principle of the plaintiffs choice of forum.' Justice Jackson may have
felt constrained by the jurisdictional precept that the federal courts "are bound to
proceed to judgment, and to afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to
which their jurisdiction extends. ' 7 In any event, the Court cast forwn non
conveniens as a limited, prudential exception to subject-matter jurisdiction and
statutory venue, rather than a wide-ranging, pragmatic tool for judicial management
of forum selection. The doctrinal result is an amalgam of the two judicial models:
forum non conveniens, which resonates with the judicial-management principle, is
recognized, but only as an exception to the general rule of plaintiff's choice.
The only major subsequent Supreme Court decision on forum non
conveniens, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 38 failed to shed much light on the
plaintiffs choice of forum. In Piper Aircraft, the Court upheld the dismissal of a
suit brought in the United States by the representative of the estates of Scottish
residents who had died in an airplane crash over Scotland.3 9 The defendant airplane
manufacturer moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens in favor of the Scottish
courts. 4o The Court held that the unfavorable substantive law in Scotland, such as
the lack of a strict-liability theory in tort and the requirement that a survivor bring a
wrongful-death action, did not weigh against a forum non conveniens dismissal.41
Most important for our purposes, the Court held that "a foreign plaintiffs choice
[of forum] deserves less deference" than that of a citizen or resident because,
has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this
"[w]hen the home forum
42
choice is convenient.
Cases like Piper Aircraft, involving foreign plaintiffs, offer an interesting
perspective on the role of the plaintiff's-choice and judicial-management principles
in forum non conveniens law. One rationale for the lesser deference accorded to
foreign plaintiffs' forum selection might be that foreign plaintiffs should not enjoy
a venue privilege at all, perhaps because non-citizens should not have an
unqualified right of access to the courts. Indeed, those judges who have insisted in
cases involving domestic plaintiffs that "American taxpayers ...have a certain

See Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff'in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 191,
211-20 (1989) (concluding that Gilbert lacks any "satisfactory justification for the basic idea of deferring to
the plaintiff's initial choice of forum").
36

37

Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).

38

454 U.S. 235 (1981).

39

See id.
at 238.

40

See id.

41

See id.at 247-55.

42

Id. at 256.
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basic right of access to American courts when the latter have jurisdiction!" might
well be open to the suggestion that foreign plaintiffs simply do not qualify for the
venue privilege. But the prevailing rule in the federal courts after PiperAircraft is
that a foreign plaintiff's forum selection is entitled at least to some deference. 44 The
degree of deference is determined by whether the foreign plaintiff has made a
"strong showing of convenience" so as to overcome the natural "reluctance to
assume that the choice is a convenient one.' 5 Thus, the judicial-management
principle has largely shaped the particular application of the venue privilege to
foreign plaintiffs. Instead of the binary choice suggested by the plaintiff's-choice
principle - whether foreign plaintiffs are entitled to a venue privilege - the courts
have opted for judicial balancing of the relative conveniences.
C.

Transferof Venue

In the federal courts, forum non conveniens has largely been replaced by
statutory transfer of venue 6 The concept of venue transfer emanates from the
judicial-management paradigm. In a pure transfer system, the plaintiffs choice of
where to lodge the lawsuit would simply initiate a judicial mechanism for deciding
de novo where the suit most properly belonged. Although the plaintiff might be
able to choose the decision-maker for the selection of venue, he would have no
substantive impact on where to lay venue.
By its language, section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, which since 1948
has allowed for venue transfer in the federal courts, appears to represent the
triumph of the judicial-management principle: "For the convenience of the parties
and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."4' Yet, as Justice
Clark noted, "[a]s words on a page torn from the history of our judicial
development, this direction is utterly meaningless." 8 The federal courts have
43

Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 165 (2d Cir.) (en bane) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1981); see also id. at 161 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
44

See R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) ("'The Court's

language that a foreign plaintiff's forum selection deserves less deference is not an invitation to accord a

foreign plaintiff's selection of an American forum no deference since dismissal for forum non conveniens is
the exception rather than the rule."') (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147,
1164 n.26 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated in part on othergrounds, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989)).
45

Lony v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Lacey v.

Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that Lony does not "requir[e] a court
somehow to mark on a continuum the precise degree it accords a plaintiff's choice").
46
Several recent proposals have been made for transfer ofvenue between state courts. See Uniform
Transfer of Litigation Act, 14 U.L.A. 181 (Supp. 1998); A Model System for State-to-State Transfer and
Consolidation, in American Law Institute, Complex Litigation: Statutory Recommendations and Analysis
App. B, at 455 (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994). The transfer-of-venue provision was originally adopted in reaction to
the Supreme Court's 1947forum non conveniens decisions and to Kepner, as discussed above. See Exparte

47

Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1949).
48

Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29,34 (1955) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
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stolidly maintained the plaintiffs forum-choice privilege by interpreting section
1404(a) to include deference to the plaintiffs choice of venue.49
Judicial deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum under section 1404(a)
may be a vestige of the forum non conveniens antecedents to statutory transfer of
venue. When the Supreme Court explained in Norwood v. Kirkpatriclethat section
1404(a) does "more than just codify the existing law on forum non conveniens,'" 1 it
was careful to note that "[t]his is not to say that the relevant factors have changed
or that the plaintiffs choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that the
discretion to be exercised is broader." 52 Even so, Justice Clark in dissent strongly
criticized any departure from forum non conveniens and warned that the majority
"goes far toward assigning to the trial judge the choice of forums, a prerogative
which has previously rested with the plaintiff."' '
In the wake of Norwood, the federal courts have been unable to agree on
how much weight to give to a plaintiff's choice of forum.' The judicial
formulations of the standard for venue transfer can be arrayed along a continuum
from the plaintiffs-choice pole to the judicial-management pole. Some courts hold
that "a plaintiffs choice of a proper forum is a paramount consideration in any
determination of a transfer request."55 Probably the majority position in the federal
courts is that the plaintiff's choice is "entitled to substantial consideration." On
the other hand, some courts regard the plaintiff's choice as merely one factor
among many.57 Finally, isolated voices can be heard from the federal bench for
something approaching the pure judicial-management model, casting aside any
special consideration for the plaintiff's choice.- Because the district court's ruling

But see Note, Constructing Alternative Avenues of Jurisdictional Protection: Bypassing
Burnham's JurisdictionalRoadblock via § 1404(a), 53 VAND. L. REv. 311, 357-70 (2000) (asserting, from a
judicial management perspective, that in practice district courts do not defer to the plaintiff's choice of an
"inappropriate forum" and use § 1404(a) to impose "fundamental fairness" on the choice of forum).
49

50

349 U.S. 29 (1955).

51

Id. at32.

52

Id.

5

Id. at 37 (Clark, J., dissenting).

See Stowell R.R. Kelner, Note, "Adrift on an Uncharted Sea:" A Survey of Section 1404(a)
Transfer in the FederalSystem, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 618-22 (1992) (emphasizing the unpredictability of
the differing standards).

54

55

Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22,25 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,401 U.S. 910 (1971).

In re Warrick, 70 F.3d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros. Inc.,
365 F.2d 439,444 (2d Cir. 1966)).
5

57

See Georgouses v. NaTec Resources, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 728, 730 (N.D. II1.1997).

See Levine v. Arnold Transit Co., 459 F. Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Il1. 1978) ("Why, under § 1404(a),
one side's preference should carry greater weight than the other's escapes us, particularly since it is
impossible to determine how much weight is to be accorded plaintiff's choice given its variable treatment by
5

the courts ....).
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on a section 1404(a) motion is an unappealable interlocutory order,5 9 and review by
writ of mandamus is usually unavailable unless the district court transferred to a
court with improper venue or failed to consider the appropriate factors,6" the
differences persist concerning the weight to accord to the plaintiffs choice.
Whatever the verbal formulations of the federal venue-transfer standard,
defendants' motions under section 1404(a) are usually denied. The plaintiff'schoice principle appears to be too entrenched in the law of venue for even the
judicial-management language of section 1404(a) to dislodge it entirely.
A further contested issue in section 1404(a) transfers is to where the case
can be transferred. Reading narrowly the statutory provision that the transfer must
be to a district where the case "might have been brought," 61 the Supreme Court
ruled in Hoffman v. Blaski 2 that a federal court cannot make a section 1404(a)
transfer to a district where the plaintiff would not have had the right to bring suit in
the first place.63 Thus, even if the defendant is willing to waive any objection to
lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue in a more convenient transferee
district, Hoffman holds that the case may not be transferred there. 64 In dissent, once
again taking the judicial-management position, Justice Frankfurter charged that
"the Court's view restricts transfer, when concededly warranted in the interest of
justice, to protect no legitimate interest on the part of the plaintiff.'' 5 Indeed, it is
difficult to defend the outcome in Hoffman on policy grounds. It appears to be the
result of rigid plaintiff's-choice thinking, in that it restricts the range of venue
choices available to the court considering a transfer motion to those originally at
the plaintiffs disposal.
Another illustration of the competition between the plaintiff's-choice and
judicial-management principles involves a different venue transfer statute, section
1407(a), which authorizes transfers by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
for "coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."' The multi-district
litigation statute is perhaps the apogee of the judicial-management principle, in that
party autonomy is subsumed to the convenience of all of the parties and of the
judicial system as a whole. Although section 1407(a) provides that "[e]ach action
so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated,"67 a practice developed of so-called "self-transfers"
59
60

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
See, e.g., In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).

61

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).

62

363 U.S. 335 (1960).

63

See id. at 343-44.

64

See id. at 344.

65

Id. at 362 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in the companion case of Sullivan v. Behimer).

66

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994).

67

Id.
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under section 1404(a). Transferee judges, who by supervision of the pre-trial
proceedings had become familiar with the coordinated cases, often found that it
would be more efficient for them to retain the cases for trial rather than send them
back to the separate transferor districts.68 In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court
put an end to this practice, ruling unanimously that the text of section 1407(a),
which states that the cases "shall be remanded,"6 9 does not admit of any judicial
discretion. 70 Although the Court's opinion was terse, the policy reasons for not
permitting the self-transfer were elaborated in Judge Kozinski's dissent in the Ninth
Circuit decision below. 71 Judge Kozinski maintained that the practice of routine
self-transfers in multi-district litigation contravened the "strong presumption that
plaintiffs choice of forum will not be disturbed., 72 Thus, even in multi-district
litigation, where judicial management might be thought to reign supreme, the
plaintiff's-choice principle retains some force.
D.

PersonalJurisdiction

While venue is the principal consideration for plaintiffs choosing among
federal courts, personal jurisdiction serves as the primary restriction on the
plaintiffs choice among state courts. Since the landmark decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,73 a defendant is not subject to suit in a given forum unless
he has "minimum contacts" with that forum. 74 The focus of the "minimum
contacts" analysis is on the defendant's conduct - whether "the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State." 75 Nonetheless, to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with "fair play and substantial justice,' 76 courts must also examine
various convenience-based factors that take into account the interests of the

68

See Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 479 (1989) (written

by the clerk of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
69
70

See Lexecon Inc v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34-3 6 (1998).

71

See In re Am. Continental CorpLincoln Say. & Loan Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1540 (9th Cir. 1996)

(Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
72

Id. at 1546.

In an earlier opinion in the same case on writ of mandamus, Judge Kozinski

expressed himself even more forcefully: "When it comes to conducting a trial (and resolving other
dispositive matters) plaintiffs retain their ancient right to select the forum." Lexecon Inc. v. United States
District Court, No. 95-70380, 1995 WL 432395, at *3 (9th Cir. July 21, 1995) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
73

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

See id. at 316. State long-arm statutes, less extensive than the Due Process Clause permits, ma,
provide further limitations. See e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
75
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472-76 (1985) (explaining the "purposeful availment" prong of personal jurisdiction).

74

76

InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
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plaintiff, the forum state and the inter-state judicial system as a whole.'
Personal jurisdiction is couched in terms of the defendant's liberty
interest! 8 In practice, however, it operates as "a doctrine to limit a plaintiff's
choices of possible fora."7 9 The doctrine of personal jurisdiction may give the
defendant a veto power over the forum of plaintiff's choice. Unlike the transfer-ofvenue doctrine, however, personal jurisdiction does not allow the defendant to
solicit a court to decide the most convenient forum. The defendant can only veto
certain inconvenient fora. From the defendant's perspective, the limited
applicability of the doctrine is compensated for by its focus on the defendant's
convenience. The only basis for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is the
defendant's inconvenience, not the convenience of all parties and witnesses.
For these reasons, personal jurisdiction only partially adopts the judicialmanagement principle. The examination of the defendant's convenience acts as a
filter to screen out cases in which the plaintiffs choice of forum is particularly
inconvenient to the defendant. After all, the plaintiff presumably will not have
chosen a forum inconvenient to himself. In this way, the overlay of plaintiffs
choice and the personal-jurisdiction doctrine results in a weak approximation of the
judicial-management principle: at least those fora plainly inconvenient to each
party are ruled out. However, the primacy of the plaintiff's choice of forum
remains. Notably, as with venue,8" the liberalization of personal jurisdiction since
InternationalShoe has ended up strengthening the plaintiff's ability to choose the
forum.
In federal court, the effect of creating a relatively wide range of forum
choices for the plaintiff has been to blur the distinction between venue and personal
jurisdiction. 81 Black-letter law insists that jurisdiction and venue are entirely
distinct conceptsYm Nevertheless, both personal jurisdiction and restrictions on
venue consider the forum's convenience to the defendant.83 The result is a

77

See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77 (listing five factors); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.

Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (dismissing suit between foreign parties for lack of personal

jurisdiction on convenience grounds).
78

See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinde, 456 U.S. 694, 702

(1982) (stating that personal jurisdiction is not based on "federalism concerns").
79

Wendy Collins Perdue, PersonalJurisdictionand the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529, 534

(1991).
80

See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.

81

See David E. Seidelson, Jurisdiction ofFederalCourts HearingFederalCases: An Examination

of the Propriety of the LimitationsImposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 82, 83 (1968)
("[Dlespite the law teacher's cant that jurisdiction and venue are distinct and disparate concepts, it remains a
fact of legal life that federal venue statutes effectively restrict the in personam jurisdiction available to federal
courts hearing federal cases").
82
See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) (stating that "the basic

difference between the court's power and the litigant's convenience is historic in the federal courts").
83
See Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476-77 (1985).
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redundancy of court-access doctrines. 4 As personal jurisdiction has evolved since
International Shoe away from notions of territorial power and toward the
embodiment of fairness to the defendant,' the demarcation between personal
jurisdiction and venue has become ever harder to locate. Accordingly, a persuasive
case can be made for a congruence of the two doctrines into a single, general
concept of "forum-reasonableness."8
Recent amendments to the federal venue statute have in large part brought
about the congruence of personal jurisdiction and venue in federal court. The most
significant innovation in the 1990 amendments to the federal venue statute was the
creation of a fallback provision laying venue in "a judicial district in which the
defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced,
if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought., 87 In many
cases, venue will be proper wherever the defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction. By expressly tying the scope of proper venue to the presence of
personal jurisdiction, Congress has helped to rationalize the law of forum selection.
III.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Another area of the law contested by the principles of plaintiff's choice
and judicial management is the selection of the federal or state court system. To be
sure, the most important disputes regarding the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts turn on concerns of federalism that are beyond the scope of this
article.88 Yet, on the margins, a plaintiff sometimes has the power to control
whether his lawsuit will end up in federal or state court.
At first glance, that power may appear odd. Federal courts jealously guard
their own jurisdiction and throw out cases that do not belong there. 89 As for
lawsuits filed in state court, the defendant has the statutory right to remove cases
See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 781, 786-95 (1985) (arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue and
forum non conveniens are redundant).
84

For historical reasons, notions of territoriality unrelated to convenience may still remain part of the
doctrine of personal jurisdiction. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.) (stating that any physical presence in the jurisdiction confers personal jurisdiction).

85

Kevin M. Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand Venue for State and FederalCourts, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 411,430-43 (1981).
87
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) (1994) (diversity of citizenship); see also id. § 1391(b)(3) (federal
86

question). Since the 1988 amendment to the provision of the venue statute for corporate defendants, "a
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to

personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." § 1391(c). Thus, the federal-court tests for
personal jurisdiction and venue over corporations are largely identical.
88

See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of FederalCourts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141

(1988) (examining the "federalist" and "nationalist" models of the law of federal jurisdiction, in an enterprise
similar to that of this article).
89
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (applying the "fundamental" principle
that "Congress [cannot] expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III").
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within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts from state to federal court.'
Accordingly, it may seem that plaintiff and defendant are equally able to direct that
federal cases end up in federal court.
However, in some cases the plaintiff - as "master of his complaint"
can structure the lawsuit so as to create or destroy federal jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs choice of what causes of action to assert and what parties to join can
determine whether there is federal jurisdiction. The doctrines granting plaintiffs
that latitude resonate with the plaintiff's-choice principle. Considering the
mandatory nature of subject-matter jurisdiction, even minor departures from the,
judicial-management principle in this area are surprising.
A.

Federal-QuestionJurisdiction

One of the fundamental precepts of federal-question jurisdiction is the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule. That rule "provides that federal jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint." 91 Even if it is apparent that the case will turn on a federal-law
defense, the federal courts lack jurisdiction if the plaintiff's cause of action is
asserted under state law.92
The well-pleaded complaint rule usually arises when the defendant
attempts to remove to federal court a lawsuit the plaintiff has filed in state court. In
that context, the federal courts apply what is sometimes referred to as the masterof-the-complaint rule. 93 That rule permits the plaintiff to decide whether to assert
federal-law claims that will support removal jurisdiction, on the theory that "the
party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon."' For
example, the plaintiff can ensure that the lawsuit remains in state court simply by
95
omitting a cause of action that, if pleaded, would support removal jurisdiction.
The pervasive influence of the plaintiff's-choice principle is unmistakable.
There is, however, a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule,
commonly known as the "artful pleading" doctrine. "If a court concludes that a
plaintiff has 'artfully pleaded' claims" by "omitting to plead necessary federal
questions," it "may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the

90
91

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (general removal statute).
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also Franchise Tax Bd.
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (holding that removal is precluded "even if
both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case").
93
See Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsideringthe Artful PleadingDoctrine, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 273, 276
(1993).
94
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22 (quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22,
25 (1913) (Holmes, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95
See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("The rule makes the plaintiff the
master ofthe claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.").
92
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face of the plaintiff's complaint. ' ' 6 So far, the Supreme Court has applied the
"artful pleading" doctrine principally in those few cases where federal law
completely pre-empts state law and replaces any state-law right of action with a
federal one. 7 Recently, the Court cut back on its previous suggestion of a more
expansive reading of the doctrine. 98 Despite the limited applicability of the "artful
pleading" doctrine, it clearly articulates the judicial-management principle that a
court - rather than the plaintiff - should decide whether a lawsuit belongs in
federal or state court.
One of the more recondite aspects of the well-pleaded complaint rule is
how to accommodate declaratory judgments. Using a declaratory-judgment action,
any lawsuit is in principle reversible. The federal Declaratory Judgment Act,9 and
its state-court analogues, permit a party to turn what would be a federal defense to
an action for coercive relief under state law into an element of a declaratoryjudgment action on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. The Supreme Court has
therefore carved out an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for
declaratory-judgment actions. 100 The federal courts will exercise federal-question
jurisdiction over a declaratory-judgment action only in cases in which, "if the
declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that
suit would necessarily present a federal question."' 0 ' This rule may at first appear
like a departure from the plaintiff's-choice principle. But that depends on who the
"plaintiff' is. The courts ignore, for jurisdictional purposes, the procedural
innovation of the Declaratory Judgment Act and scrutinize instead a putative action
by the "natural" plaintiff- the defendant to the declaratory-judgment action. If the
"plaintiff' is considered in this way to be the party with a cause of action for

98

Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998).

97

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557
(1968) (Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185). The lower courts have found other
instances of complete pre-emption. See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arote Assocs., I F.3d 225, 231-33 (4th Cir.
1993) (Copyright Act § 301(a), 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)). In addition, some cases indicate that the defendant may
remove actions brought under state law that involve an important federal question. See Arthur R. Miller,
Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1781, 1786-93 (1998) (analyzing
"substantial federal question" cases as a separate prong of the artful-pleading doctrine).
In FederatedDep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), a case in which the plaintiffs first
98
filed in federal court and, once those claims were dismissed, filed a separate action in state court, the Court
stated that the plaintiffs "had attempted to avoid removal jurisdiction by artfully casting their essentially
federal law claims as state-law claims." Id. at 398 n.2. The courts of appeals interpreted the Moitie footnote
to permit removal based on the res judicata effect of a federal-court judgment, or perhaps on a theory of
election of remedies. See Ragazzo, supra note 93, at 307-15. In Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470
(1998), the Supreme Court disavowed the Moitie footnote. See id. at 477.
99

28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).

100

See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1983); Skelly

Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-74 (1950). The exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule for declaratory judgments can also be regarded as part of the "artful pleading" doctrine. See Skelly Oil,
339 U.S. at 673-74.
FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19.
101
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coercive relief, the exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is consistent with
the plaintiff's-choice principle after all.
B.

Diversity-of-CitizenshipJurisdiction

The plaintiff's-choice principle also helps to explain some of the doctrines
allowing plaintiffs, in certain circumstances, to create or destroy diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction in federal court. The jurisdictional statute requires
"complete diversity" - no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of thedefendants. 10 2 Despite the seeming objectivity of this jurisdictional criterion,
plaintiffs have devised several methods for creating or destroying diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction.
The most brazen way to attempt to create diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction where none exists is for the plaintiff to assign his claim to a citizen of
another state. However, Congress has enacted a statute precluding jurisdiction in
cases "inwhich any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction" of the federal courts. 03 This
judicial-management device has worked well in thwarting sham assignments and
focusing courts on the substantive structure of the case rather than the form of the
plaintiffs pleading. 04 Another common method of trying to manufacture federalcourt jurisdiction is to align the parties as plaintiffs or defendants in the complaint
in such a way as to create complete diversity. Here, too, the judicial-management
principle has prevailed, and courts will "look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the
parties according to their sides in the dispute."' 05 However, in some cases a plaintiff
can create federal-court jurisdiction by simply not joining a party whose presence
would destroy diversity of citizenship. So long as the absent party is not deemed
"indispensable," 'l 6 this device will succeed in conferring federal-court jurisdiction
102

See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (announcing the "complete diversity"

rule). The jurisdictional statute also requires an amount in controversy of more than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The plaintiff's-choice principle allows the plaintiff to prevent removal to
federal court by claiming an amount below the jurisdictional threshold, even though he might have claimed
more. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094-97 (11th Cir. 1994). But cf Rogers v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871-73 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that removal is proper if state law would permit

plaintiff to recover more than the amount claimed in the complaint and that defendant establishes that it is
more likely than not that plaintiff will recover more than the jurisdictional amount, even though plaintiff
stipulated after removal that her damages are below the jurisdictional amount).
103
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994). A related statute provides that the representative of an estate is deemed
to be a citizen of the state of the decedent Id. § 1332(c)(2). This statute ended the practice of appointing an

out-of-state representative to create diversity jurisdiction.
104
See Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969) (true plaintiff assigned cause of action
to nominal plaintiff for $1 and retained 95% interest in recovery). Some earlier decisions had adopted a
plaintiff's-choice view that such assignments did not violate § 1359. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d
73 (10th Cir. 1962) (assignment from corporation to sole shareholder), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
105
City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Say. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180
(1905); see also City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (holding that in re-aligning
parties, the court looks to the "primary and controlling matter in dispute").
106

See FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
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on the truncated lawsuit.107
The same competing principles recur in the debates over devices to destroy
diversity jurisdiction and thereby prevent the defendant from removing the action
to federal court. There is no statute preventing collusive assignments of claims to
destroy federal-court jurisdiction, as there is for assignments designed to create
jurisdiction." 8 Nonetheless, federal courts are generally just as intolerant of sham
transactions designed to defeat removal.10 9 Similarly, the judicial-management
principle has carried the day in allowing courts, upon removal to federal court, to
re-align parties to create diversity jurisdiction." 0 In the context of party joinder,
however, the plaintiff's-choice principle has proved resilient. The doctrine of
"fraudulent joinder" prevents the joinder as defendants only of persons against
whom the plaintiff has no bona fide claim. 1 The plaintiff may legitimately
preclude removal by joining as defendants persons whom he knows to be
judgment-proof. 12 As one court expressed this doctrine, in classic plaintiff's-choice
terms:
If under our dual court system a potential plaintiff has a choice
between a state forum and a federal forum, it is his privilege to
exercise that choice subject to legal limitations, and if he can
avoid the federal forum by the device of properly joining a
defendant or a nondiverse co-plaintiff, he is free to do
nondiverse
13
1

SO.

Both with respect to creating and destroying diversity jurisdiction, the
judicial-management principle is weakest in the context of a plaintiff's decision
regarding what parties to join. 14 The courts are reluctant to take the activist step of
107

See Western Md. Ry. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 960, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Congress has so far

proscribed only collusive joinder meant to invoke federal jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1359; parties may still
obtain a federal forum by colluding not to join").
108
See supratext accompanying note 103.
109

See, e.g., Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. Me. 1969) ("mhe essential

diversity of citizenship of the parties at bar has not been vitiated by plaintiffs' sham transaction.").
See, e.g., Broidy v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 186 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1951) (re-aligning
110
non-diverse co-plaintiff and upholding removal to federal court where that party in fact "ha[d] every interest
in supporting the plaintiff's recovery").

ill

See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1907).

112

See, e.g., Clipper Air Cargo, Inc. v. Aviation Prods. Int'l, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. S.C.

1997) (drawing "the distinction between a defendant who was fraudulently joined and a defendant who was
judgment proof").
Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Medicine Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1977) (remanding to
113
state court because ofjoinder of non-diverse co-plaintiffs who, although not indispensable parties, were real
parties in interest).
See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking PlaintiffAutonomy and the
114
Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 825 (1989) (listing reasons plaintiffs

often decline to join potential co-plaintiffs). Freer has forcefully expressed the judicial-management view:
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restructuring the scope of a plaintiff's lawsuit. Consequently, a plaintiff is often
permitted to pursue related lawsuits in federal and state court against different
defendants. 1"5 The judicial inefficiencies that result can be justified only on the
basis of the plaintiff's-choice principle.
IV. DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION
The area of duplicative litigation is one for which the principle of judicial
management appears excellently suited. When the judicial system is burdened with
a repetitive lawsuit brought by the same plaintiff in a different forum, or a reactive
lawsuit in which the defendant in the first suit sues the original plaintiff in a
separate action, inefficiencies naturally result.1 16 Duplicative litigation arises in a
number of different doctrinal contexts, including injunctions against suits in
another federal court, federal-court abstention in favor of parallel state-court
proceedings, and discretion over whether to hear a declaratory-judgment action. In
each case, however, the legal doctrines have been shaped by the cross-currents of
the plaintiff's-choice and judicial-management principles.
A.

Anti-Suit Injunctions

Perhaps the most blatant example of duplicative litigation is when the
same underlying dispute is the subject of two lawsuits in the same court system.
The litigants either ask the favored court to enjoin the opposing party from
proceeding in the alternative forum - an "anti-suit injunction" - or ask the
disfavored court to stay or dismiss its proceedings in favor of the parallel action.
Either way, the issue is which suit gets priority. In that situation, the plaintiffschoice principle counsels in favor of giving priority to the first-filed lawsuit. Under
this view, the plaintiff who won the race to the courthouse should not be deprived
of his action because the second-filed suit will likely be more efficient or
convenient. On the other hand, the judicial-management principle supports
balancing the relative conveniences of the two lawsuits and giving priority to the
lawsuit likely to lead to the more efficient resolution of the underlying dispute.
According to the judicial-management principle, the question of which party filed
first should function as no more than a tie-breaker when the balance of
conveniences is close.
The leading Supreme Court case on anti-suit injunctions within the federal-

"A plaintiff... has no right to sole possession of center stage; we need to tell the prima donna of the legal
world that she must work with some co-stars." Id. at 813.
See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal of
115
federal-court suit, in light of parallel state-court suit brought by same plaintiff against other defendants, on the
ground that "it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit").
116

For the origins of this terminology, see Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REv.

525 (1960); and Allan D. Vestal, Reactive Litigation,47 IOWA L. REV. 11 (1961).
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117
court system, Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.,
adopted the judicial-management principle. Kerotest involved a common patentlaw fact pattern, the so-called "customer suit," in which the patentee sues a
distributor of the allegedly infringing product (the "customer"), rather than the rival
manufacturer itself.11 In Kerotest, the manufacturer then brought a declaratoryjudgment action to have the patent declared invalid."1 9 The stage was set when the
patentee joined the manufacturer as a defendant in the first-filed action. 120 The
manufacturer was unable to join the customer in the declaratory-judgment action,
presumably due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter, did not apply the first-to-file rule, 121 stating that "[w]ise judicial
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution
of such problems."12 2 As between the two suits, the Court preferred the customer
suit because all parties to the controversy were before that court, and "all interests
will be best served by prosecution of the single action. 123
Despite the judicial-management tone of the Kerotest opinion, the lower
federal courts have generally adhered to a first-to-file rule with limited
exceptions. 24 For example, the Second Circuit gives priority to the first-filed suit
with two exceptions: first, if the first-filed suit is a "customer suit" in patent
litigation, and second, if "forum-shopping alone motivated the choice of the situs
for the first suit., 125 It is unclear what triggers the forum-shopping exception in the

117

342 U.S. 180 (1952).

118

See id. at 185-86.

119

See id.

120

See id. at 186.

121

The district court in the declaratory-judgment action had enjoined the patentee from proceeding

against the manufacturer in the customer suit, on the ground that the manufacturer's declaratory-judgment
action was the first filed as between the patentee and the manufacturer. See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two
Fire Equip., 92 F. Supp. 943, 947 (D. Del. 1950) (citing Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930
(3d Cir. 1941) (applying first-to-file rule), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942)).
122
Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 183.
123

Id. at 184.

See, e.g., Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 95-97 (9th Cir. 1982); Mattel, Inc.
v. Louis Marx & Co., 353 F.2d 421, 423-24 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed,384 U.S. 948 (1966). But
see Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 627-29 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rejecting
"mechanical application" of the first-to-file rule and using "equitable considerations" to give priority to the
second-filed action in the District of Columbia).
125
See William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1969);

124

Mattel, 353 F.2d at 423-24 & n.4. In the customer-suit cases, the balancing of conveniences generally favors
the manufacturer's declaratory-judgment action. See, e.g., Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735,
738 (1st Cir.) (establishing "rebuttable presumption" in favor of manufacturer's declaratory-judgment action),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); William Gluckin, 407 F.2d at 179-80. The Federal Circuit has recognized

the customer-suit exception. See Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Second Circuit case law.12 The district courts have seldom found "forum
shopping" except when the recipient of a demand letter spurns the prospect of
settlement and files an anticipatory suit in an effort to pre-empt the threatened
action.1 27 Inherent in any litigation for which alternative districts are available is the
plaintiff's choice of venue; that alone cannot constitute forum shopping in the sense
the Second Circuit intended.128
The law of anti-suit injunctions in federal court remains confused. The
principal reason for that is the uneasy co-existence of Kerotest's admonitions of
wise judicial management with the first-to-file rule. The appeal of the first-to-file
rule lies in the reluctance of many judges to substitute their own conclusions about
what the litigative structure of the dispute should be for the structure chosen by the
plaintiff.
B.

Federal-CourtAbstention

The doctrine of federal-court abstention is another instance of the tensions
between competing legal principles. The federal courts are prohibited by statute
from issuing anti-suit injunctions against state-court proceedings.1 29 Accordingly,
when faced with duplicative litigation in federal and state court, the federal court
must decide whether to stay or dismiss its proceedings in favor of the state-court
action. Inevitably, federalism issues are paramount. Yet here, too, the judicialmanagement principle plays its part in shaping forum selection. In ColoradoRiver
Water ConservationDistrict v. United States,1 a° the Supreme Court extended the
principles of Kerotest to duplicative litigation between federal and state court.''
to
The same considerations of "[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard ' 132
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation,
apply to federal-state duplicative litigation, unrelated to the federalism concerns
underlying traditional abstention doctrines.133 Despite the "virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them,"''" the Court
126
The cases are not illuminating. See, e.g., Motion Picture Lab. Technicians Local 780 v. McGregor
& Werner, Inc., 804 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1986).
Hanson plc v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 932 F. Supp. 104, 106-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
127
See e.g.,

see infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
128
A plain example of forum shopping is when the plaintiff, having received an adverse ruling in
another court, tries to get a second bite at the apple and files a repetitive action. See Semmes Motors, Inc. v.
(condemning plaintiffs' "forum shopping
Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.)
or, more accurately, judge shopping").
129
See Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
130

424 U.S. 800 (1976).

131

See id.at 817-18.

132

Id.at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Corp., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).

133

See Id.

134

Id.at 817.
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held that in "exceptional" circumstances, concerns of judicial efficiency could lead
to dismissing or staying the federal suit in favor of parallel state-court litigation.' 35
As further developed in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
ConstructionCorp.,'3 the list of relevant concerns includes the interest in avoiding
piecemeal litigation, the assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res, the
relative convenience of the fora to the parties, the order in which the courts
obtained jurisdiction, the source of substantive law to be applied, and the adequacy
of the state-court proceedings. 137 The Colorado River abstention doctrine is a clear
example of the judicial-management principle, because a plaintiff can lose his
federal forum for reasons of overall systemic efficiency.
The Ninth Circuit has gone further and authorized Colorado River
abstention in cases in which the district court finds that the federal-court plaintiff
engaged in "forum shopping." In one such case, American International
Underwriters, (Philippines),Inc. v. ContinentalInsurance Co.,3 a plaintiff in New
York state court, faced with the prospect that crucial evidence would be
inadmissible under the New York evidence rules, brought a duplicative action in
federal court in California, where it could enjoy the more liberal Federal Rules of
Evidence. 139 The court held that the plaintiffs "forum-shopping, or 'rule-of41
evidence shopping,""' 4 was properly weighed as a factor in favor of abstention.
Although the Ninth Circuit has instructed lower courts that forum shopping alone is
not a sufficient reason for abstention, 42 the Ninth Circuit continues to include
forum shopping, along with the factors that the Supreme Court has enumerated, for
Colorado River abstention. 4 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit appears to have pushed the
judicial-management principle a little further.

135

See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-19.

136

460 U.S. I(1983).

See id. at 19-27; see also Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine,
75 GEO. L.J. 99, 118-28 (1986). Consistent with the judicial-management principle of avoiding needless
waste ofjudicial efforts, the Court has adopted a flexible first-to-file factor: "priority should not be measured
exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has been made in
the two actions." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21.
137

138

843 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1988).

139

See id. at 1255.

140

Id. at 1259.

141

The differences in evidentiary rules involved expert opinion testimony and exceptions to the

hearsay rule. See id. at 1259 n.5.
142

See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nichols, 885 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1989).

143

See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush, 87 F.3d 290, 297 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth

Circuit's approach has also been followed in the Eighth Circuit. See Federal Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v.
Arkansas Elec. Coops., Inc., 48 F.3d 294, 299 (8th Cir. 1995). But see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 740 F.2d 566, 570-71 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that abstention in favor of state-court
action filed earlier by the same plaintiff would improperly "force the plaintiff to choose its forum").
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DeclaratoryJudgmentActions

As previously mentioned," 4 the declaratory-judgment procedure threatens
to undermine the conceptual structure of plaintiff-initiated litigation. Every statecourt action is potentially reversible using the Declaratory Judgment Act. The
"natural plaintiff' - the party with the cause of action for coercive relief - can
find itself defending a declaratory-judgment action. This opens up new
opportunities for forum shopping by the actual or potential state-court defendant,
acting as a federal-court plaintiff.
In Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,145 the Supreme Court shut down this

technique by interpreting the Declaratory Judgment Act as an exception to normal
obligatory-jurisdiction precepts. 46 In Wilton, when one party gave notice of its
intention to file a state-court action for coercive relief, the other party acted first
and filed a declaratory-judgment action in federal court.147 Because the Declaratory
Judgment Act "'confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon
the litigant,"" 148 the Wilton Court held that federal district courts enjoy discretion on
whether to hear a declaratory-judgment action. 49 In the case before it, the Court
ruled that "considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration"
supported a stay of the federal-court proceedings.'5 With its emphasis on avoiding
duplicative litigation, the Wilton holding appears to be based on the judicialmanagement principle.
The most important open question in the wake of Wilton is whether its
ruling applies when the parallel action is in another federal (rather than a state)
court.' 5' In Wilton, the Court expressly reserved the question of applying its
discretionary standard when the dispute turns on questions of federal (rather than

144

See supratext accompanying notes 99-102.

145

515 U.S. 277 (1995).

146

See id. at 286-88.

The Supreme Court had previously held that jurisdiction in a Declaratory

Judgment Act case was discretionary. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1942).
More recently, though, several courts of appeals had applied the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado
River to declaratory-judgment actions. See Employers Ins. ofWausau v. Missouri Elec. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d
1372, 1374-75 (8th Cir. 1994); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411,
413-14 (2d Cir. 1986).
147

See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 280.

148

Id at 287 (quoting Public Sere. Comm'n v. WycoffCo., 344 U.S. 237,241 (1952)).

149

See id. at 288.

Id. Although the court of appeals decision in Wilton expressed disapproval of the federal-court
plaintiffs' "attempts to forum shop," Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 41 F.3d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1994), af'd, 515
U.S. 277 (1995), the Supreme Court did not expressly refer to that consideration.
151
Another open issue is whether Wilton applies to other federal procedural statutes, besides the
150

Declaratory Judgment Act, that encompass discretionary jurisdictional principles. See N.Y. Life Distributors,
Inc. v. Adherence Group, Inc., 72 F.3d 371,379-82 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying Wilton to the federal interpleader
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1209 (1996).
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state) law.1 52 Accordingly, some courts have read Wilton to be founded on
federalism concerns and have not applied it to disputes involving duplicative
federal-court litigation.1 " On the other hand, many federal courts even before
Wilton declined to hear declaratory-judgment actions in cases in which a parallel
damages action had been filed. Because the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is to protect potential defendants from uncertainty, these courts reasoned that
the pendency of the action for coercive relief means that "a declaratory judgment
would serve no useful purpose."'15 4 Moreover, many courts do not want to reward
perceived forum shopping when parties who are put on notice of a potential lawsuit
win the race to the courthouse by filing a declaratory-judgment action. 5 These
judicial-management concerns have been complemented by the plaintiff's-choice
principle. Several courts have declared that "'a suit for declaratory judgment aimed
solely at wresting the choice of forum from the "natural" plaintiff will normally be
dismissed."" 56 Reactive litigation using the declaratory-judgment procedure is a
situation in which the role of the plaintiff's-choice principle is unclear. Reflexive
plaintiff's-choice thinking might allow the first-filed lawsuit to proceed in favor of
the second suit, regardless of which was the action for coercive relief. The more
faithful application of the plaintiff's-choice principle, however, may be to defer to
the choice of forum by the "natural plaintiff," which usually means favoring the
action for coercive relief over the declaratory-judgment action. Thus, the judicialmanagement and plaintiff s-choice principles will often result in the same legal
rules for reactive litigation using the declaratory-judgment procedure. Although the
Supreme Court opinion in Wilton articulates more clearly the judicial-management
principle, subsequent cases may show whether the plaintiff's-choice principle
remains an important part ofjudicial decision-making in this area of the law.

152

See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.

153

See Youell v. Exxon Corp., 74 F.3d 373, 376 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (implying that federal-court

abstention would always be inappropriate in a case involving federal law and distinguishing Wilton as a state-

law case), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1251 (1996).
154
Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng'g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
Continental Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 947 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1991) (establishing a "presumption"
that a declaratory-judgment action should give way to a coercive action in another court). This reasoning has
been rejected in patent cases, in which an action for a declaration of patent invalidity is considered on the
same footing as an action for patent infringement. See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the Tempco rule because it would systematically favor patentees); see also cases
cited supra in note 125.
155
See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed'n, 996 F.2d 774, 776 n.7, 778 (5th Cir.
1993); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979).
156
BASF Corp. v. Symington, 50 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 592-93
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (permitting anticipatory declaratory-judgment suits would "deprive the plaintiff of his
traditional choice of forum and timing, and... provoke a disorderly race to the courthouse").
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V.

CHOICE OF LAW

One of the most important potential consequences of forum selection is a
difference in applicable law. The Erie57 doctrine ensures that federal courts will
apply the same law (including choice-of-law rules) as courts of the states in which
they sit.'60 Forum selection between court systems should therefore have no effect
on the applicable law. Among the states, however, there are significant differences
in choice-of-law rules, and the federal system provides little constraint on states'
choice-of-law rules. Consequently, the substantive law applied to a given dispute
often depends on the place of suit.
A.

State Choice-of-Law Rules

States differ widely in their choice-of-law rules.159 This diversity has a
profound effect on the significance of whether a court defers to the plaintiffs
choice of forum. If courts always applied forum law, then it would follow
automatically that a plaintiffs choice of forum would also be a choice of the
substantive law. At the other extreme, if choice-of-law analysis were forum-neutral
and uniform across jurisdictions, then the plaintiffs choice of forum would have no
effect on the substantive law applied to the facts of the case.
Traditionally, courts applied what is known as the "vested rights" approach
to the conflict of laws. Under this approach, associated with the first Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, courts generally applied the law of the place where the cause of
action was said to have accrued, such as lex loci delicti for torts or lex loci
contractus for contracts.1 60 Occasionally, courts had leeway in which state's law
would apply, such as when the applicable law in a given case turned on
characterizing whether the plaintiff's claim sounded, say, in tort or in contract.' 61
More recently, most courts have abandoned the traditional "vested rights"
theory for explicit "interest analysis." For example, the second Restatement calls
for determining the state with the "most significant relationship" to the dispute, as
indicated by several choice-influencing considerations. 16 Yet, critically, the
"choice-of-law revolution" has taken place differently in different states, and the

157

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

158

See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

159

See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1999: One More Year, 48

AM. J. COMp. L. 143, 145 (2000).
160
See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
161

§§ 332,377 (1934).

See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (Conn. 1928) (characterizing

claim by plaintiff injured in automobile accident against company that rented car to negligent driver as
sounding in contract rather than in tort).
162

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 6 (1971).
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current law is characterized by a welter of different choice-of-law approaches.'6
One feature of many modem approaches to the conflict of laws is a marked
tendency to apply the law of the forum (the lexfori). Some states explicitly favor
lexfori; for example, Kentucky courts will apply their local law whenever there are
"enough contacts" with the state." Other states incorporate the "better law" as one
of the choice-influencing considerations and, not surprisingly, find more often than
not that their own law is better. 165 In still other states, interest analysis has in
practice tended toward application of forum law." Indeed, some choice-of-law
theorists have called for explicit recognition of a lex fori approach.' 67 Relatively
few courts appear to have been troubled by the avenues for forum shopping opened
up by favoring local law.les The result is what one commentator has termed
"conflicts localism.' 6 9
The consequence of the difference among states' choice-of-law rules and
the tendency of choice-of-law analysis to favor the forum state is of heightened
importance in forum selection. The current lack of uniformity in choice-of-law
rules means that the plaintiff who can capture the forum can also capture the
applicable choice-of-law rules - and perhaps the substantive law that the court
will apply. Further, the bias toward lex fori means that, even if the choice-of-law
rules are identical, the plaintiff who can capture the forum stands a better chance of
getting the substantive law he wants. The more choice-of-law rules vary among the
states, and the more states favor application of their own law, the more significant
the plaintiff's forum-selection privilege becomes.
Finally, the lex fori approach is most entrenched for issues considered
"procedural" rather than "substantive," for which courts apply forum law without
163
See Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 n.2 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
the states use ten different choice-of-law theories).
See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972); Amett v. Thompson, 433
S.W.2d 109,
113 (Ky. 1968).
165
See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. 1973) (applying forum law in part
because it was "better" than the foreign law in question). Recent Minnesota cases place less emphasis on the
"better law" factor. See Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91, 96-97

(Minn. 2000).
166

A well-known example is Rosenthal v. Warren,475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 856

(1973), in which the court applied New York law in a wrongful death action in which plaintiff's decedent, a
New York resident, travelled to Massachusetts and was operated on there.
167
See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L.
REV. 637 (1950). Cf Louise Weinberg, A StructuralRevision of the Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L. J.475,
483-85 (2000). (arguing that courts should give more weight to lexfori and should not consider the interests
of other jurisdictions).
An exception is Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985), in which the
court explicitly considered "reduc[ing] forum-shopping opportunities" in deciding to apply the same
substantive law as the other interested state would have. Id.at 687.
169
Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the ForgivingConstitution, 71 IND. L. 271, 271 (1996); see
168

also Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.440, 467 (1982) ("The new

approaches to choice of law have in common a widely noted tendency to result in the application of forum
law - in other words, of plaintiff's law.").
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further analysis. 7 ' One of the more important - and debatable - procedural
issues is the statute of limitations. 71 In cases in which the statute of limitations has
run in one state but not another, the plaintiffs ability to select the forum can be
critical. 172 The principal check against forum shopping for a longer statute of
limitations is the "borrowing statute" that most, but not all, states have enacted.
These statutes provide that, under some circumstances, the forum court borrows the
statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action accrued. 73 Because of
the lack of uniformity in borrowing statutes and the fact that many favor resident
plaintiffs, 74 the borrowing statutes have not entirely eliminated forum shopping in
this area. Recently, several states have re-classified statutes of limitation as
substantive, either judicially or by statute . 7 Thus, the effect of the plaintiffs
choice of forum on the applicable statute of limitations depends in large measure on
the states involved in the dispute.
B.

FederalLimitations on Choice ofLaw

The federal system offers several potential - but as yet unrealized
limitations on the states' freedom to formulate pro-forum choice-of-law rules..
These potential limitations include the enactment of a federal choice-of-law
statute'76 and the development of a federal common law of conflict of laws. 177 The
most obvious such limitation, though, is the United States Constitution. 178 Just as
the Due Process Clause has proved a powerful limitation on states' assertions of
170

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. b (1971).

Id. The principal common-law exception to this rule is a statute of limitations built into the statute
171
creating the right of action. See id. § 143.
See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), discussed infra at text accompanying
172
notes 214-227.
173

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 142 reporter's note (1986).

174
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 (McKinney 1990) (providing that the claims of a non-resident
plaintiff are governed by the shorter statute of limitations as between New York and the state where the cause
of action accrued, whereas the claims of a resident plaintiff are always governed by New York's statute of

limitations).
175

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1986) (providing that the court

should generally apply a shorter forum statute of limitations but generally should not apply a longer forum
statute of limitations unless the forum has a substantial interest); UNIF. LIMITATIONS ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 158
(1996) (providing that the court should generally apply the statute of limitations of the state whose
substantive law applies); see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 418 (N.J. 1973) (discarding the
traditional rule that statutes of limitation are regarded as "procedural").
176

See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Casefor FederalChoice of Law

Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1991).
177

See Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1730

(1992).
178

Recently, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between the Due Process and Full Faith and

Credit Clauses as sources of limitation on state choice-of-law rules. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 729-30 n3, 735 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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personal jurisdiction, so too could the Supreme Court police the states' application
of their 17own
law in cases in which they have only a tenuous relationship to the
9
dispute.
The leading modem case on federal limitations on choice of law is Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague.180 Hague was a case in which plaintiffs decedent was
killed in an automobile accident in Wisconsin.181 Everyone involved in the accident
resided in Wisconsin. 182 The Court held that the forum "must have a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."183 When applied to
the facts of the case, though, the Hague Court set a low threshold. The Court
upheld the Minnesota courts' decision to apply Minnesota law to the dispute on the
basis of the following aggregation of contacts: plaintiffs decedent worked in
Minnesota, the defendant insurer did business in Minnesota, and the plaintiff had
moved to Minnesota after the accident but before filing suit.1 84 Thus, in Hague, the
plaintiffs choice of Minnesota as the place of suit determined the law applied
despite the attenuated connection between Minnesota and the underlying dispute.
The result in Hague is based on the plaintiff's-choice principle.
Conversely, the best recent illustration of the judicial-management
principle is PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts.18 5 In Shutts, the Kansas courts applied
Kansas law in a nationwide class action, even though most of the absent members
of the plaintiff class "had no apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for
this lawsuit." 18 6 In a clear repudiation of the plaintiff s-choice principle, the Shutts
Court declared that the "plaintiffs desire for forum law is rarely, if ever
controlling., 187 The Court therefore concluded that application of Kansas law to
members of the plaintiff class residing outside Kansas "is sufficiently arbitrary and
179

See generally Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1587 (1978)

(arguing that a state's application of its own law must be fair to the parties and consistent with the needs of
the judicial system as a whole); Weinberg, supra note 169, at 487 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
exercise only "minimal scrutiny" over a state's choice of law).
180

449 U.S. 302 (1981).

181

Id. at 305.

182

See id. Minnesota law permitted a policy-holder to recover the total coverage amount for all

automobiles he owned and insured (a legal rule known as "stacking"), whereas Wisconsin law did not.
183
Id. at 313 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). A majority of the Court endorsed this test in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutis, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).
184
See Hague, 449 U.S. at 313-20. The dissent noted that plaintiff's decedent's place of employment
and the plaintiff's post-accident change of residence were unrelated to the dispute and that the defendant
insurer did business in all fifty states. See id. at 337-39 (Powell, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent
observed that, "[i]f a plaintiff could choose the substantive rules to be applied to an action by moving to a
hospitable forum, the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible." Id. at 337.
185

472 U.S. 797 (1985).

186
Id. at 815. There were several conflicts between the law of Kansas and that of Oklahoma and
Texas, where most of the plaintiffs resided. See id. at 816-18.
187

Id. at 820.
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unfair as to exceed constitutional limits. '190
In practice, the constitutional limitation on state choice-of-law rules has
had little effect in curtailing the effects of the plaintiff's choice of forum. The
slender aggregation of contacts with the forum in Hague can be matched in most
cases, thereby allowing the forum to apply its own law. The Shutts holding is
unlikely to apply outside the context of a class action; if a defendant had as few
contacts to a state as most members of the plaintiff class did in Shutts, the court
would lack personal jurisdiction and would not reach the choice-of-law question. 8 9
Thus, in light of Hague and Shutts, the judicial-management principle - which
urges a more forum-neutral approach to choice of law - has been largely still-born
in the area of constitutional limitation on state choice-of-law rules.
The constitutional limitation on choice-of-law principles that favor
applying the lex fori is even weaker if the conflict involves the statute of
limitations. In Sun Oil v. Wortmnan,190 the Court held that, because statutes of
limitations were traditionally classified as "procedural," the Constitution set no
limits on the forum's ability to apply its own statute of limitations. 19' Wortman
strongly supports the plaintiff's-choice principle by encouraging plaintiffs to bring
suit in a forum with a longer statute of limitations.1
For example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,93 the plaintiff brought
suit in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of
limitations had not run." The Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction over the
defendant publisher based on its purposeful sale of the magazine in New
Hampshire.1 95 Although the plaintiff had no contacts with New Hampshire, the
Court considered her choice of forum unobjectionable.196 On remand, the Supreme
188

Id at 822.

189

In Shutts, the Court held that "a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent

class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum which
would support personal jurisdiction over a defendant." 472 U.S. at 811.
190
486 U.S. 717 (1988). Wortman reviewed the Kansas Supreme Court's decision on remand from
Shutts.
191
Idat 722-30. The concurrence reached the same result by applying interest analysis rather than
relying on tradition. See id.
at 737 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). A
majority of the Court left open the question whether there is any constitutional restraint if the foreign state
regards its statute of limitations as substantive, rather than procedural. See id at 742; id. at 743 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192
The Fourth Circuit, in reaching the same result as Wortman one year earlier, declared that "[t]here
is nothing inherently evil about forum-shopping." Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir.
1987).
19
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
194

Id at 778.

195

See id at 781.

"Petitioner's successful search for a State with a lengthy statute of limitations is no different from
the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or procedural rules
or sympathetic local populations." Id at 779.
19
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Court of New Hampshire adhered to the traditional rule that statutes of limitation
are "procedural" and upheld the application of New Hampshire's statute of
limitations.1 97 In dissent, Justice Souter (then on the New Hampshire Supreme
Court) described the case pointedly as an "egregious example of forum
shopping."'1 98 He urged that statutes of limitations be considered substantive and
concluded that New Hampshire had no interest in applying its own statute."
Keeton illustrates the wide latitude that states currently enjoy in
formulating their choice-of-law rules. In the narrow sense, the question of forum
selection was decided when the Supreme Court ruled that New Hampshire had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The significant implications of the
plaintiffs forum selection, though, lay in the consequent application of the lex

fori.20 0 The judicial-management principle that Justice Souter espoused in dissent,

which would have prevented the plaintiff from choosing the law of a state to which
she had no connection whatsoever, did not prevail. Thus, Keeton underscores the
significance of the plaintiff's-choice principle.
C.

Transfer of Venue andChoice of Law

Although the conflict-of-laws problem arises most forcefully in the context
of state-court litigation, the federal venue-transfer statute also calls for choice-oflaw analysis. Federal courts adjudicating state-law claims under diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules. 201 This
principle follows naturally from the dictate in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins= of
vertical uniformity between federal and state courts. But what choice-of-law rules
apply if the plaintiff files suit in federal court in one state and the defendant then
successfully moves under section 1404(a) to transfer venue to federal court in a
second state?
The Supreme Court answered this question in 1964 in Van Dusen v.
Barrack,203 holding that the transferee court must apply the choice-of-law rules that
the transferor court would have. 2o The Court held that Erie's vertical-uniformity

197

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1192-94 (N.H. 1988).

The statute-of-

limitations issue had been certified to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire from the First Circuit. See id at
1188. In an alternative holding, if the statute of limitations were considered to be "substantive," the New
Hampshire court affirmed the use of forum law as the "better law." Id. at 1195.
198
Id. at 1197 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
199

See id. at 1198-1204.

200

Cf Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960,

987-93 (1981) (arguing that the "minimum contacts" test should be the same for choice-of-law as for personal
jurisdiction).
201
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
202

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

203

376 U.S. 612 (1964).

204

See id. at 642-43.
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requirement mandated "identity... between the federal district court which decides
the case and the courts of the State in which the action was filed."2 0 5 The Court
recognized that its holding "allow[ed] plaintiffs to retain whatever advantages may
flow from the state laws of the forum they have initially selected,"20 6 but
maintained that such an advantage was entirely appropriate because "§ 1404(a)
operates on the premise that the plaintiff has properly exercised his venue
privilege."2 '7 The Court was concerned not with plaintiffs' forum shopping, but that
defendants "might well regard [§ 1404(a)] as a forum-shopping instrument."2 8"
Therefore, the Court concluded that "[a] change of venue under §'2 1404(a)
generally
°
should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms. 9
The judicial-management model would have decided Van Dusen
differently. If the second forum is so much more convenient that the defendant can
overcome the plaintiff's forum-selection privilege, systemic efficiency would be
furthered by proceeding as though the plaintiff had initially filed suit in the second
forum. Indeed, when venue is transferred under section 1406 because venue was
improper in the district where plaintiff filed suit,210 the courts do apply the choiceof-law rules of the transferee forum. 211 The rationale for the different rule is that the
transferor forum was outside the plaintiff's forum-selection privilege.212 The coexistence of these two rules is a strong example of plaintiff's-choice thinking, in
that the question of which state's choice-of-law rules govern turns on a binary
decision as to whether the plaintiff's forum selection was privileged or not.
Justice Goldberg's opinion in Van Dusen is notable for its explicit
recognition of the "plaintiff's venue privilege., 21' However, its systemic-efficiency
rationale for avoiding defendants' forum shopping is suspect. Certainly, defendants
indifferent as to the supposed disparity in convenience between the plaintiff's
chosen forum and an alternative forum may forbear from moving to transfer under
section 1404(a) when they cannot gain a change in choice-of-law rules. But this
scenario ought to be relatively rare, since a defendant would only be able to
205

Id. at639.

206

Id at 633.

207

Id. at 634.

208

Id at 636.

209

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. By contrast, in transfers involving federal (rather than state) law,

most courts have held that the law of the transferee circuit should apply. See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines

Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (§ 1407 transfer), aff'd on other groundssub nom. Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
210
See 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1994).
211

See, e.g., Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992).

Similarly, when the court transfers under § 1404(a) and the transferor court had no personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, the transferee court will apply its own law. See, e.g., Muldoon v. Tropitone Furniture Co., 1
F.3d 964,967 (9th Cir. 1993).
212
See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634.
213

Id at 635.
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overcome deference to the plaintiffs forum selection by showing that the
alternative forum is significantly more convenient. Thus, if Van Dusen had been
decided differently, there would be few cases in which a defendant would
successfully move to transfer venue only because of the choice-of-law
consequences. On the other hand, Van Dusen encourages plaintiffs' forum
shopping by allowing the plaintiff to capture favorable choice-of-law rules. In
choosing among proper venues, a plaintiff will file suit in the forum with the most
favorable choice-of-law rules even though he knows that the court will grant
defendant's motion to transfer under section 1404(a).
The opportunities for plaintiffs' forum shopping were expanded when the
Court extended Van Dusen to plaintiff-initiated transfer motions in Ferens v. John
Deere Co. 21 4 The plaintiff in Ferens was a resident of Pennsylvania who had been
injured there, but the two-year statute of limitations for his personal-injury claim
had run in Pennsylvania. 15 So he brought suit against a national manufacturer in
federal district court in Mississippi, because Mississippi conflicts law mandated the
application of Pennsylvania substantive law but Mississippi procedural law,
including the six-year Mississippi statute of limitations.216 Then the plaintiff
himself moved to transfer the case under section 1404(a) back to Pennsylvania, the
forum most convenient for him. 217 The Court held that the choice-of-law results
under section 1404(a) were the same regardless of which party moved for
transfer.218 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that "[a]n opportunity for
forum shopping exists whenever a party has a choice of forums that will apply
different laws." 2 9 In dissent, Justice Scalia deplored the Court's rule, which
allowed a plaintiff "to appropriate the law of a distant and inconvenient forum in
which he does not intend to litigate, and to carry that prize back to the State in
which he wishes to try the case." ' Although Justice Scalia set forth the practical
objections to the plaintiff's "filing-and-transfer" ploy,"1 he rested his dissent on the
vertical uniformity principle of Erie and Klaxon. 22 A problem with Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion was that he had to concede that Van Dusen, which he did not
want to overrule, had already "compromised" the Erie principle "in the abstract" by
instructing federal courts in certain circumstances to apply the choice-of-law rules

214

494 U.S. 516 (1990).

215

See id. at 519.

216

See id.

217

See id. at 519-20.

218

See id.at 523.

219

Ferens,494 U.S. at 527.

220

Id. at 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

221

See id. at 536-39.

22

See id. at 535-36, 539-40.
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of another forum, which would never occur in state court.22 3
Most commentators have shared Justice Scalia's outrage at the improbable
4 Of course, one cause of the outcome in that case was
result in Ferens.22
Mississippi's treatment of statutes of limitations as procedural for choice-of-law
purposes - an anachronistic rule that some states have recently abandoned.
Another culprit is section 1404(a), which allows the plaintiff to move for transfer of
venue even though he was responsible for the initial selection of venue. 2 ' Yet,
given both those preconditions, Ferens followed naturally from the plaintiff'schoice reasoning in Van Dusen v. Barrack, which tolerated plaintiffs' forum
shopping.2 7 The choice-of-law rules in federal venue transfer are perhaps the most
thoroughgoing success of the plaintiff's-choice paradigm.
VI. FORUM SHOPPING
So far, I have demonstrated that both the plaintiff's-choice and judicialmanagement principles have explanatory power across a wide range of legal
doctrines concerning forum selection. Although the two principles often conflict,
neither can be considered dominant, or favored in our legal system over the other.
At this point, I want to step back from examining the plaintiff's-choice and
judicial-management principles and offer some thoughts on the implications of
these principles for the current debate on "forum shopping."
Judge Skelly Wright once described forum shopping as our."national legal
pastime.'228 The commonplace nature of forum shopping has not, however, earned
it a good name. One reason for the general opprobrium is the amorphous nature of
the term. In many disputes, the parties have a choice of forum. The term "forum
shopping" is generally reserved for a choice of forum regarded as improper for
some reason. 2 9 Thus, the description of a particular practice as "forum shopping"
223

Id. at 535.

224

See, e.g., Kimberly Jade Norwood, Double Forum Shopping and the Extension of Ferens to

FederalClaims That BorrowState Limitation Periods,44 EMORY L.J. 501, 555 (1995); David E. Seidelson, I
(Wortman) + I (Ferens) = 6 (Years): That Can't Be Right - Can It? Statutes ofLimitations andSupreme
CourtInconsistency, 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 787 (1991).
225
See supratext accompanying note 175.
226

See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).

227

Norwood's claim that Van Dusen was "against forum shopping," Norwood, supra note 224, at

555, overlooks that, as we have seen, Van Dusen targeted only defendants' forum shopping and did not
disturb the plaintiff's forum-selection privilege.
228
J.Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REV. 317, 333 (1967).
229

Cf Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A RealisticLook at Selecting a Venue,

78 NEB. L. REv. 79, 80 (1999) (positing that the traditional view is that "forum shopping [is] a terrible thing,
practiced by only the most manipulative and devious attomeys"); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1677, 1677 (1990) ("[i]t is difficult for an observer to note definitively that forum shopping
has occurred without analyzing the litigant's motives.'); Georgene M. Vairo, Is Selection Shopping?, NAT'L
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tells us little without an understanding of what the proper principles of forum
selection are.
There can be little doubt that forum selection affects the outcome of
litigation. The choice of favorable substantive law is the most dramatic prize for the
successful forum-shopper, but there are also many important procedural
distinctions among courts. Less tangible from a theoretical perspective, but just as
real for the practicing lawyer, are differences in the quality and sympathies of the
judge and in the pool from which the jury is drawn.230 A recent empirical study of
transfer motions in federal court found a marked decline in the plaintiff's rate of
winning in cases in which venue was transferred. 231 Another study found a similar
decline in the plaintiff's win rate in cases removed to federal court.z 3 Forum
shopping can be outcome-determinative.
This raises the question why our judicial system allows such wide latitude
for forum shopping.2 3 Although perhaps an obvious question, it has seldom been
answered. Some degree of forum shopping is probably inevitable in any judicial
system with courts of independent, but overlapping, jurisdiction. 234 Forum
shopping may be a price we pay for federalism. Yet that does not mean that there
need be so many opportunities for forum shopping. As we have seen, there are
many situations in which courts could, but do not, stop litigants from forum
shopping. 35
One possible explanation is that the law has a substantive preference for
plaintiffs. It has been suggested that enforcement of plaintiffs' rights in interstate
cases leads to "rational national policies in favor of safe and fair interstate
L. J., Sept. 18, 2000, at A16 (arguing that the forum selection becomes "forum shopping" only when the
choice of forum is "frivolous").
230
For example, it has been suggested that the reason for the dispute over personal jurisdiction in
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), was that the plaintiff joined non-diverse
defendants in an effort to preclude the defendants from removing the case so as to ensure that the case would
be tried to a state-court jury drawn from just one county. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International,63 TULANE L. REv. 553, 560 (1989).
231
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80
L. REv. 1507, 1511-12 (1995) (finding that the plaintiff wins in 58% of non-transferred federalcourt cases but only 29% of transferred cases).
232
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About
CORNELL

the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REV.581, 593 (1998) (finding that
the plaintiff wins in only 37% of cases removed to federal court). Although these data are persuasive, they
are not conclusive. The groups of cases in which venue is transferred or which are removed to federal court
are not necessarily comparable to litigation as a whole.
233
See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo. L.J. 53, 69 (1991) ("What accounts for such
persistent plaintiff bias in the evolved mechanism of interstate litigation?").
234
See Algero, supra note 229, at 82 (claiming that forum shopping is "an intrinsic part of the
American judicial system" because of the independence of the federal and state court systems).
235
One commentator has recently offered a "defense of forum shopping," which urges that attorneys
should zealously defend their clients' interests by taking advantage of all of the opportunities for forum
shopping afforded by the procedural rules. See id. at 11. However, the commentary does not attempt to
answer the question posed in this article, which is why there are so many forum-shopping opportunities in the
first place.
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commerce." 238 Under this view, opportunities are created for forum shopping so as
to make it more likely that injured parties (plaintiffs) can find a court in which they
can find redress. I find this explanation implausible. The fundamental place in our
judicial system of the principle of party-neutrality makes even an implicit juridical
bias in favor of plaintiffs unlikely. Moreover, it is impossible to say a priori
whether an outcome in favor of the plaintiff is a good thing without reference to the
underlying substantive law.237 Increasing the number of plaintiffs' victories in
general does not further any substantive goal.
Another possible explanation for the toleration - or encouragement - of
forum shopping is federalism. One commentator has suggested that the Supreme
Court disfavors forum shopping between federal and state courts but encourages it
among state courts. 238 In this view, "[s]tate-state forum-shopping is fundamentally
different from federal-state forum shopping because the latter impairs state
governance, while the former reflects the differences state governance fosters. 239
There is something to this explanation. By ensuring vertical uniformity of the
applicable substantive law, the Erie doctrine has eliminated one of the principal
reasons for forum shopping between federal and state courts. Yet even under Erie
undeniable differences between federal and state courts remain, and as we have
seen various legal doctrines continue to allow some forum shopping between court
systems.24 In addition, it is not clear that forum shopping among state courts in fact
furthers the states'-rights principles that the current Supreme Court is said to favor.
Increased forum shopping does not encourage diversity in state law or fortify the
sovereignty of state courts. 241 Rather, a greater scope for forum shopping simply
allows the plaintiff - rather than a court - to select the forum. Federalism
concerns cannot explain why that should be so.
Yet another possible explanation - and undoubtedly the most prosaic
for why there is so much forum shopping is historical accident.242 In the last several
238

Weinberg, supra note 233, at 69; see also Weinberg, supra note 169, at 463-70; Note, supra note

229, at 1693.
237
Weinberg believes that there is a systematic under-enforcement of the law, which justifies a pro-

plaintiffbias. See Weinberg, supranote 233, at 70-71.
238

See George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping -

Why Doesn't a Conservative Court

ProtectDefendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649,708-13 (1993).
239
Id at 710; see also id. at 711. ("Federalism is the dominant variable in the forum-shopping
equation."); Note, supra note 229, at 1693-95 (suggesting that forum shopping encourages "local
autonomy").
See supra Part 11. Brown's otherwise excellent article is perhaps too focused on choice-of-law
240
rules to the exclusion of other reasons for forum shopping. See Brown, supra note 238, at 695 ("Choice of
law practices in the state courts are the main impetus behind the current wave offorum-shopping.").
241
Because Brown concentrates on choice of law, he argues that the Supreme Court favors state
sovereignty by not imposing significant constitutional limits on state choice-of-law rules. See Brown, supra
note 238, at 695-700, 704-06.
242

Cf. Stein, supra note 84, at 795-808 (arguing, based on the changes in the law of personal

jurisdiction and venue, that "[t]he doctrinal redundancy of the various court-access doctrines and the
differences in the procedural ramifications of each doctrine appear to be in significant measure the result of
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decades, several critical court-access doctrines were fundamentally altered:
2
personal jurisdiction was expanded by International Shoe and its progeny; 4
federal venue rules were liberalized; 244 and the Declaratory Judgment Act was
enacted. 245 During the same period, the "choice-of-law revolution" swept through
the states.246 All of these changes in legal doctrine expanded the scope for forum
shopping - but as an unintended consequence. This explanation too may have
some merit. But it can explain only why our judicial system incorporates so many
opportunities for forum shopping; it cannot provide the underlying justification for
the plaintiffs ability to shop for a forum, which pre-dates any of those changes in
legal doctrine.
Finally, one justification of forum-shopping that has been advanced is that
deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum lessens the judicial resources devoted to
rulings on the place of suit. Under this view, the plaintiffs privilege "is best
understood simply as an impediment to unnecessary redecision of, or
reconsideration of, forum choice issues. 24 r This argument employs the efficiency
concems that underlie the judicial-management principle in support of tolerating
plaintiffs' forum shopping. Yet the argument is unpersuasive. The plaintiff's
forum-selection privilege is a strong thumb on the scales, but it does not relieve the
courts of having to balance those scales. Anyone observing the amount of judicial
attention devoted today to questions of forum selection is unlikely to conclude that
the plaintiff's privilege minimizes decision-making costs in practice.
The strongest justification for forum shopping is the plaintiff's-choice
principle. After all, inherent in the principle that the plaintiff can choose the place
of suit is that the plaintiff may shop for a favorable forum. The plaintiff's privilege
of forum selection is meaningful only if the plaintiff can choose a court that he
believes will be more favorable to his interests than the more logical or convenient
court. Forum shopping is made possible by the fact that the law provides a range of
permissible venues, instead of establishing rules that would lead to a single proper
place of suit.
When courts defer to the plaintiffs choice to bring suit in a state or federal
judicial district with tenuous connections to the underlying dispute, they in effect
ratify forum shopping.248 Conversely, when courts follow the judicial-management
historical accident").
243
See supra Part II.D.
244

See supra Part II.A.

245

See supra Part IV.C.

246

See supra Part V.A.

247

McAllen, supra note 36, at 242. Applying a cost-benefit analysis, McAllen argues that the

plaintiff's privilege is more efficient than its conceptual alternative - a "central court of forums" that assigns
each newly filed lawsuit to its proper forum. Id.at 242-51. McAllen's analysis is followed in Robert A.
Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 MicH. U. L. REv. 703, 709-10
(1995).
248
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405,
1466 (2000) (noting that forum shopping flourishes because the law "doles] not even theoretically
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principle and steer the suit to the most convenient forum, they curtail forum
shopping.
The plaintiff's-choice principle posits that the lawsuit belongs to the
plaintiff - it is his chose in action, his property. Under this view, the plaintiff, as
"master of his complaint," should be able to select the forum in which to vindicate
his right to relief. This is fundamentally a private-law view of civil litigation - one
with deep roots in our common-law tradition. Forum shopping partakes just as
much of that tradition as do other incidents of party autonomy, such as the
plaintiff's right to choose what causes of action to assert.
The label "forum shopping," with its negative connotations, is little more
than a rhetorical device used in defense of outcomes supported by the judicialmanagement principle. As we have seen, there are many situations in which
plaintiffs can control the place of suit that are not called "forum shopping." There is
no principled distinction between those cases and ones in which the plaintiffs'
actions are condemned as "forum shopping." Thus, the cases on forum selection
cannot be explained by whether or not they involve "forum shopping": either they
all do, or none of them does. Rather, the best way to understand the cases is
through the lenses of the two competing legal principles: plaintiffs choice and
judicial management.
VII. CONCLUSION
Efforts to curtail forum shopping affect only a fraction of the cases in
which the plaintiff can control the place of suit. There are many more in which
courts decide to let the plaintiff choose the forum. Across legal doctrines regarding
forum selection, the plaintiff's-choice principle authorizes forum shopping in many
situations. The equally powerful counter-principle of judicial management tends to
support judicial control over the place of suit.
The tension between the two principles leads to the conflicted nature of the
law of forum selection. Inconsistent judicial decisions, or exceptions that threaten
to swallow the rule, can often be explained as the result of courts' applying
different principles to similar situations. The divide between judicial management
and plaintiff's choice is the fault line underlying the law of forum selection.
Likewise, the basic resonance of both principles in our legal culture helps to
explain why the current debate on forum shopping remains unresolved.
The purpose of this article is not to urge the primacy of either principle of
forum selection. Rather, I hope that identifying these two fundamental principles
will help to make legal reasoning regarding forum selection more transparent. This
article has pointed out some of the internal inconsistencies in legal doctrines
regarding forum selection, resulting from the co-existence of the two competing
principles. At the same time, plaintiffs choice and judicial management are
organizing principles that point the way toward structural coherence across legal
doctrines in the law of forum selection.
contemplate a single, most appropriate venue for each case").
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